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777 
TALKING DRUGS: THE BURDENS OF PROOF IN POST-
GARCETTI SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIMS 
Thomas E. Hudson 
Abstract: Law Enforcement agencies fire their employees for speaking out in favor of 
drug legalization, which leads the employees to sue their former employers for violating their 
First Amendment Free Speech rights. These employee claims fall under the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s complex speech retaliation test, most recently articulated in Garcetti v. Ceballos. The 
analysis reveals that circuit courts are inconsistent as to who bears the burden of proving that 
they prevail under “Pickering balancing,” and how they should construct that burden. This 
Comment argues that U.S. Supreme Court precedent demands that the employer bears the 
“Pickering balancing” burden, and that the Court should require employers to meet their 
burden with clear and convincing evidence. Further, when applying the speech retaliation test 
to law enforcement employees criticizing the war on drugs, the Court should rule that it 
constitutes speech as a “citizen on a matter of public concern,” and should abandon the quasi-
military rule when engaging in “Pickering balancing.” 
INTRODUCTION 
“[L]egalization of drugs would end the drug war and related violence 
in Mexico.”1 Following his statement, Bryan Gonzalez’s employer—the 
United States Custom and Border Patrol—fired him for the content of 
his speech.2 Gonzalez’s case is not unique—state and federal employers 
alike have fired employees for verbally opposing the drug war.3 
Similarly, public employers have fired employees for associating with 
Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP), an organization that 
supports legalizing marijuana and ending the drug war.4 
These new cases highlight a doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court 
created in Pickering v. Board of Education.5 That doctrine grants public 
employees the right to sue government employers for termination in 
violation of the First Amendment if their termination is based on speech 
                                                     
1. Complaint at 3, Gonzalez v. Manjarrez, Jr., No. CV 11-29 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2011) 
[hereinafter Gonzalez Complaint] (quote summarizing a report of what Gonzalez said). 
2. Id. at 4. 
3. Marc Lacey, Police Officers Find That Dissent on Drug Laws May Come With a Price, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2011, at A11; see generally Miller v. Mohave Cnty., No. CV-11-8182-PCT-FJM, 
2012 WL 1078828 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012). 
4. Lacey, supra note 3, at A11; see, e.g., Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4 (summarizing 
a report of what Gonzalez said). 
5. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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made as “a citizen on a matter of public concern.”6 Over time, the Court 
has complicated the speech retaliation test developed in Pickering 
(speech retaliation test) by splitting it into three prongs of ever 
increasing detail.7 The Court’s creation and modification of these three 
prongs have greatly narrowed the situations in which employees can 
prevail on a speech retaliation suit.8  
A court engages in a three-prong test when assessing an employee’s 
speech retaliation claim for comments about the war on drugs. The 
employee must prevail on each of the three separate prongs to win a 
speech retaliation suit. The first prong requires a court to ascertain 
whether or not the speech is made as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern.9 If the employee proves that he or she prevails on this first 
prong, a court will subject the claim to the second prong, which the 
Court refers10 to as “Pickering balancing.”11 This balancing analysis 
requires a court to determine whether the employee’s interest in 
speaking outweighs the employer’s interest in efficiently running a law 
enforcement agency.12 Finally, where a court finds that the employee 
prevails on both the first and second prongs, a court will engage in a 
third prong, requiring it to determine whether the speech actually caused 
the employee’s termination.13 
While the first and third prongs of the speech retaliation test have 
clearly established burdens of proof, the second prong—Pickering 
balancing—does not. The courts have failed to reach a consensus 
regarding which party has the burden of proof. In fact, the courts have 
failed even to define the burden. 
Pickering balancing’s lack of clarity in regards to its burden leads to 
unpredictable and overabundant litigation because the employers’ and 
employees’ rights are not clearly delineated. The lack of clarity will lead 
                                                     
6. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). Note that the source of the procedural authority 
to sue, like with most other Constitutional lawsuits, is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sheldon H. Nahmod, 
Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 
U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 590–91 (2008). 
7. Beth Anne Roesler, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Judicially Muzzling the Voices of Public Sector 
Employees, 53 S.D. L. REV. 397, 416 (2008). 
8. See id. at 398–99, 416, 419 (stating that the Court has greatly narrowed the speech retaliation 
test).  
9. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
10. Id. 
11. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs, v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996). 
12. See Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying “Pickering 
balancing” in a police officer employment context).  
13. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
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to costly litigation, as courts struggle to conduct an unclear balance of 
the employer and employee interests. Clarifying the balancing’s burden 
of proof will not only streamline litigation, but will also help prevent 
employees from being fired for offensive speech by more effectively 
informing employers and employees as to their rights and 
responsibilities. Part I of this Comment will discuss the prevalence of 
law enforcement employers firing their employees for speaking out 
against drug laws. Part II will outline the modern speech retaliation test 
and its three main prongs, including each prong’s unique burden of 
proof. Part III will argue that the Court should place a burden of clear 
and convincing evidence on the employer whenever the Court conducts 
Pickering balancing. Part IV will apply the speech retaliation test to 
instances where law enforcement employees criticize the war on drugs, 
and will argue that the Court should apply the speech retaliation test in a 
manner that favors employee speech. 
I. STATE AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
HAVE RECENTLY FIRED THEIR EMPLOYEES FOR 
OPPOSING THE DRUG WAR 
Law enforcement agencies have recently fired their employees for 
verbally opposing the war on drugs.14 Employers have fired employees 
for such speech both inside and outside of the workplace.15 Consider 
Bryan Gonzalez, a New Mexico Border Patrol agent,16 who made a 
number of controversial assertions while talking with a coworker during 
his shift break.17 These included a statement that the “legalization of 
drugs would end the drug war and related violence in Mexico,”18 and 
mention of the website LEAP.19 
Gonzalez’s coworker reported these comments.20 After an internal 
investigation, Gonzalez’s superior fired him, stating that Gonzalez had 
“personal views that were contrary to the core characteristics of Border 
Patrol Agents, which are patriotism, dedication, and esprit de corps.”21 
                                                     
14. See generally Lacey, supra note 3; Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4; Miller v. 
Mohave Cnty., No. CV-11-8182-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL 1078828, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012). 
15. See generally Lacey, supra note 3. 
16. Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. LEAP is an organization of law enforcement members who support drug 
decriminalization. Id.  
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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Gonzalez had no administrative remedy because he was a probationary 
employee when he was fired.22 Gonzalez subsequently brought a 
lawsuit23 for speech retaliation in violation of the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free speech.24 
Gonzalez’s case is one of a number of recent cases. Joe Miller, a local 
probation officer in Mohave County, Arizona, is currently suing for 
speech retaliation.25 His employer fired him for signing a letter—in his 
personal capacity—from LEAP. The letter supported Proposition 19, 
which proposed to legalize the recreational use of marijuana in 
California.26 The government argued that because Miller’s signature 
included his job title, the public could misinterpret Miller’s personal 
support to constitute the parole agency’s endorsement of the initiative. 
Miller countered that because the letter had a disclaimer at the bottom 
stating that “[a]ll agency affiliations are listed for identification purposes 
only[,]”27 it was sufficiently clear that he was speaking as a private 
citizen, rather than on behalf of his law enforcement employer. 
Another speech retaliation case occurred a few years before Gonzalez 
and Miller began their suits. Mountlake Terrace Police sergeant Jonathan 
Wender settled his wrongful termination suit for $815,000.28 One of his 
key legal arguments29 was that the government violated the First 
Amendment by retaliating against him for speaking out against the drug 
war (both internally and in the press).30 Because this argument was part 
of his successful claim, pro-marijuana legalization groups have taken 
this case as a victory for their cause.31 This comment will next discuss 
the multi-pronged speech retaliation test that governs the cases discussed 
above. 
                                                     
22. Id. Gonzalez was a new hire, and his employment was subjected to a standard “probationary” 
status for his first two years. Id. at 2. He was fired before those two years ran out. Id.  
23. When this Comment went to publication, the case was still ongoing. 
24. Gonzalez Complaint, supra note 1, at 5. 
25. Lacey, supra note 3, at A11; Miller v. Mohave Cnty., No. CV-11-8182-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL 
1078828, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012).  
26. Lacey, supra note 3, at A11; Miller, 2012 WL 1078828, at *1. The voters failed to pass 
Proposition 19. John Hoeffel & Maria L. La Ganga, Youth Vote Falters; Prop. 19 Falls Short, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A17. 
27. Lacey, supra note 3, at A11. 
28. Id. at A15.  
29. Many issues crossing many areas of law complicate this case. See generally First Amended 
Complaint, Wender v. Snohomish Cnty., No. CV 07-0197 Z (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2007) 
[hereinafter Wender Complaint]. 
30. Id. at 9–10, 13. 
31. See Lacey, supra note 3, at A15. 
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II. THE COURT MUST ENGAGE IN A MULTI-PRONGED TEST 
WHEN ANALYZING A SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIM 
Although government employees can challenge a termination as 
unconstitutional speech retaliation,32 not all employee speech is 
protected,33 and not all protected speech can sustain a claim for 
retaliatory dismissal.34 The modern speech retaliation claim requires a 
court to analyze three separate prongs, each with a unique burden of 
proof. Recently, Garcetti v. Ceballos35 blurred the lines between the 
prongs, further complicating the three-prong test. 
A. A Modern Speech Retaliation Claim Requires Courts to Conduct a 
Three-Prong Test, with Each Element Having Its Own Burden of 
Proof 
Over time, the Court has developed a jurisprudence governing the 
free speech rights of public employees.36 The Court’s primary purpose in 
early cases was to establish that a speech retaliation claim actually 
existed.37 As a result, the older speech retaliation cases did not employ a 
multi-prong test.38 However, the Court’s legal framework to address a 
                                                     
32. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (providing an example of a speech 
retaliation claim). The Court decided to apply this speech retaliation doctrine to a plaintiff private 
school in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291, 299–
300 (2007). The school sued the local sports association (which it voluntarily contracted with) for 
speech retaliation, because the association punished the school for violating its recruiting rules. Id. 
at 294–95. While in this case the Court ruled against the plaintiff school, id. at 304, the Court’s 
application of Pickering suggests that in the future the Court could protect not only individual 
government employees, but also private organizations and corporations from speech retaliation by 
the public agencies they contract with, id. at 299–300. See also id. at 306 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (criticizing the Court’s extension of speech retaliation doctrine to a public body, 
rather than an employee). The possibility that the Court will extend this doctrine to private entities is 
particularly likely given the Court’s desire to give the same First Amendment protections to 
corporations and organizations that it provides individuals. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, __ U.S. __,130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (ruling that “the Government may not 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity[,]” hence “[n]o sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations”). 
33. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (establishing that speech is not protected if 
and when its value is limited to the employment context). 
34. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996) (“[E]ven termination because of 
protected speech may be justified when legitimate countervailing government interests are 
sufficiently strong.”) (emphasis added). 
35. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
36. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (discussing “Pickering and the cases decided in its wake”).  
37. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
38. See, e.g., id. (showing how the speech retaliation test was discussed in broad amorphous 
terms at this time); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977). 
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speech retaliation claim evolved over time.39 
During this evolution, the Court broke the speech retaliation test 
down into a multi-faceted inquiry.40 Today, the speech retaliation test’s 
three prongs are (1) whether the employee speaks as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern,41 (2) whether the employee’s interest in 
speaking outweighs the employer’s interest “in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs,”42 and (3) whether the proposed 
speech caused the employee’s termination.43 
1. Employees Bear the Burden of Proving that They Made Their 
Speech as a Citizen on a Matter of Public Concern 
The first prong requires that the employee speaks as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern.44 The employee bears the burden of proof for 
this prong.45 Garcetti greatly narrowed the speech retaliation test46 by 
splitting this first prong—the citizen on a matter of public concern 
                                                     
39. See Roesler, supra note 7, at 398–99 (“[Following Pickering] [s]ubsequent cases served to 
narrow and refine the [speech retaliation] test by focusing on the methods used and factors 
employed in administering the balancing test.”); see also Kathryn B. Cooper, Garcetti v. Ceballos: 
The Dual Threshold Requirement Challenging Public Employee Free Speech, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 
73, 74 (2006). Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75, with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. The Court 
decided Mt. Healthy in 1977. The most important case law did not occur until after 1980, including 
Connick, Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), and 
Garcetti. Note that the fact that these questions arise as § 1983 civil rights lawsuits may bear 
responsibility for the Court’s decision to narrow the speech retaliation doctrine over time, as the fear 
of lawsuits drives many of the Court’s decisions. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 590–94 (discussing 
how the § 1983 setting effects the underlying merits of the Constitutional Claim).  
40. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 569–70, 577–78 (explaining the Court’s shift from an “ad hoc” 
balancing system to a system of “categorical balancing”). While the Court used to determine 
employee speech protection based on an amorphous rebalancing in each case, today’s employee 
speech protection is determined based on which of a series of discrete categories the speech falls 
into. Id. at 569–70. See Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A 
Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 189 (2008) 
(explaining the breakdown of the balancing of interests into two-prongs).  
41. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 147–48 (1983). 
42. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
43. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
44. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
45. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F.3d 351, 355 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 
418 (“The first [inquiry] requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter 
of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based 
on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). 
46. See Roesler, supra note 7, at 419 (explaining that the Court has greatly narrowed what can 
sustain a Speech Retaliation claim for a public employee).  
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prong—into two sub-elements of its own: (1) a “citizen” sub-element 
and (2) a separate “matters of public concern” sub-element.47 The citizen 
sub-element requires that employees’ speech is not “pursuant to their 
official duties,”48 and the matters of public concern sub-element 
preserves the original determination of whether or not the speech is 
related to issues of public importance.49 This section will first discuss the 
matters of public concern sub-element and then the citizen sub-element.  
a. The First Amendment Only Protects Employees Who Speak on a 
Matter of Public Concern 
Pickering established that in order to sustain a speech retaliation 
claim, an employee must prove that his or her speech addressed 
“matter[s] of public concern.”50 Conversely, speech that “primarily 
concerns an issue that is ‘personal in nature and generally related to [the 
speaker’s] own situation,’ such as his or her assignments, promotion, or 
salary,” is not a matter of public concern.51 In Pickering, Marvin 
Pickering, a public school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor of a 
newspaper opposing a proposed tax measure designed to increase 
funding to the school that employed him.52 Pickering not only wrote to 
oppose the tax, but also to criticize the school board’s conduct in its 
previous attempts to promote past tax increase proposals.53 He also 
questioned the school’s motives in passing the latest proposal.54 
Applying the principle of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan55—a case 
creating broad First Amendment protection in the libel context—the 
Supreme Court ruled that a public employer cannot terminate a teacher 
                                                     
47. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court bifurcated the 
“citizen on a matter of public concern” inquiry), cert. denied, Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. 
Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.). It also had a great effect on the second “Pickering balancing” prong. See 
infra Part II.A.2.  
48. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
49. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–
48. 
50. 391 U.S. at 574. 
51. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 236 (alteration in original) (quoting Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hosp. 
Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
52. 391 U.S. at 566. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. Notably, he closed his letter by stating: “I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer and 
voter, not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken from the teachers by the administration.” 
Id. at 578.  
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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for speech like Pickering’s.56 The Court reasoned that because the 
speech addressed a tax sent to the public for a vote, it constitutes speech 
made as a citizen on “a matter of legitimate public concern.”57 Thus, the 
Pickering Court held that while there is no “right” to employment, the 
First Amendment still greatly limits the government’s power to 
terminate employees addressing matters of public concern.”58 
Further, the Pickering Court stated that protecting speech on matters 
of public concern is important for reasons beyond the individual’s 
interest in speaking.59 Society benefits from listening to the speech of 
those working in the government60 because their public positions give 
them unique knowledge and experience regarding the public 
organizations that employ them.61 Protecting this societal benefit has 
remained important to the Court in subsequent decisions.62 
Courts determine on a case-by-case basis whether a given instance of 
speech qualifies as speech made on a matter of public concern.63 Courts 
will analyze “the content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record.”64 To receive protection, the speech must 
“be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community.”65 A plurality declared that instead of 
leaving the question to a court’s factual finding, the employer’s 
reasonable belief determines what the employee said for the purposes of 
conducting the speech retaliation test.66 
                                                     
56. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75. 
57. Id. at 571.  
58. Id. at 568 (“[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be 
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.”) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967)). 
59. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 433 (2006). 
60. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72.  
61. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 433. 
62. See, e.g., id. at 419; City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004); United States v. Nat’l 
Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995). 
63. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 146. 
66. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677–78 (1994). The Waters plurality reasoned that the 
employer is entitled to use his own, flexible procedures to determine what the employee said, 
without the judiciary using its far stricter fact-finding procedures (constrained by the rules of 
evidence, etc.) to second guess the employer’s reasonable conclusions. Id. at 675–76. The plurality 
could not get a majority because it argued that the Court should ensure that the employer’s belief 
was “reasonable.” Id. at 677–78. This “reasonableness” requires that the employer “tread with a 
certain amount of care[,] . . . the care that a reasonable manager would use before making an 
employment decision . . . of the sort involved in the particular case.” Id. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas, while supporting that the employer’s belief should control, argued that the Court 
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Although a court must analyze the employee speech in its entirety, 
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District67 establishes that 
the speech’s actual content—as opposed to whether the employee spoke 
in public or private—controls whether the speech addresses matters of 
public concern.68 In Givhan, a teacher named Bessie Givhan complained 
privately to her employer about her school’s racially discriminatory 
policies.69 The school terminated Givhan for her complaints, and she 
sued for speech retaliation.70 Like the teacher in Pickering, Givhan 
commented on an important public issue—racial discrimination in 
schools.71 But unlike Pickering, who made his comments publically in a 
newspaper, Givhan made her comments to her superior in private.72 
Thus, the Court had to decide whether this difference between private 
and public communication affected the matters of public concern 
analysis. 
The Court determined that the First Amendment protects Givhan’s 
speech as a matter of public concern, even though her speech was made 
privately.73 The actual content of the speech is the most important factor 
in determining whether it is made on matters of public concern, rather 
than the location of the speech.74 
Rankin v. McPherson75 demonstrates that the offensiveness of the 
speech in question does not change whether it touches on matters of 
public concern.76 Rankin dealt with Ardith McPherson, who served as a 
clerical worker in a local county law enforcement agency.77 She talked 
with her coworker—who was also her boyfriend—about a news report 
                                                     
should accept the employer’s belief regardless of whether said belief is reasonable. Id. at 686 (Scalia 
J., concurring in the judgment).  
67. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). 
68. See id. at 414. 
69. Id. at 411–13. 
70. Id. at 411–12. 
71. Id. at 411–13. 
72. Id. at 412, 414. 
73. Id. at 414. 
74. See id. Whether the employee made the speech in private or public is not controlling. 
However, the Court may still consider this as part of the speech’s context. See Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (stating that analyzing a claim requires analysis of “the content, form, 
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record”).  
75. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
76. Note however, that the Court may consider offensiveness a great deal on the second 
“Pickering balancing” prong discussed in Part II.A.2. 
77. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 380–81. 
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that an assassin had shot President Ronald Reagan.78 McPherson 
criticized Ronald Reagan’s policies and said “if they go for him again, I 
hope they get him.”79 Her boss learned of this comment and fired her.80 
The Court stated that while her speech may be “inappropriate or 
controversial,” it nevertheless qualifies as speech on matters of public 
concern.81 The Court reasoned that speech regarding an attempted 
assassination of the country’s leader is an issue of importance to the 
public.82 
Pickering, Givhan, and Rankin all protected statements on matters of 
public concern—those statements which have value outside of the 
employment context. In contrast, the Court in Connick v. Meyers83 
declined to extend First Amendment protection to speech on matters of 
private concern, where the speech’s value was limited to the employee’s 
workplace.84 District Attorney Harry Connick Sr. transferred his 
subordinate, Sheila Meyers, to another area of the criminal court over 
her objections.85 In an attempt to garner support against her transfer, 
Meyers sent a questionnaire to all of her coworkers, asking them to 
comment on “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a 
grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether 
employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”86 Connick 
fired Meyers for distributing this questionnaire, and Meyers sued for 
speech retaliation.87 
The Court ruled that Meyer’s questionnaire did not significantly 
address matters of public concern, because its value was almost 
exclusively limited to “matters only of personal interest.”88 The Court 
reasoned that because the questionnaire was limited to a discussion of 
internal workplace policies and conflicts, it had “only a most limited” 
                                                     
78. Id. at 381. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 381–82. The Court reiterated its position that death threats are not protected speech, but 
determined that Meyers’ speech did not qualify as a threat. Id. at 386–87. 
81. Id. at 386–87.  
82. Id. at 386. 
83. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
84. Id. at 147–48. 
85. Id. at 140–41. 
86. Id. at 141. 
87. Id. 
88. See id. at 147, 154. The Court admitted that one question, the question discussing whether 
employees felt “pressure[] to work in political campaigns,” did regard a “matter of public concern.” 
Id. at 149. However, the Court ruled that “Pickering balancing” favored the employer in this case in 
regards to that question. Id. at 149–54. 
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“public concern” component.89 Practicality motivated the Court’s 
holding as “government offices could not function if every employment 
decision became a constitutional matter.”90 Through its holding in 
Connick, the Supreme Court effectively narrowed the definition of 
matters of public concern to only protect that speech which the public 
has an interest in hearing.91 
In City of San Diego v. Roe,92 the Court extended the Connick 
principle—that the First Amendment does not protect speech criticizing 
the workplace if that speech has no public concern component—to 
purely private speech unrelated to commentary on the employee’s 
workplace. In Roe, an off-duty police officer made and sold a 
pornographic video featuring himself in a police uniform.93 The Police 
department fired him for distributing this video.94 The Court upheld the 
termination, ruling that the video did not address a matter of public 
concern because pornographic videos have no connection to necessary 
public information.95 
b. After Garcetti v. Ceballos, Courts Must Analyze a Citizen Sub-
Element by Determining Whether an Employee’s Speech Was 
Pursuant to Official Duties 
Garcetti v. Ceballos added a new citizen sub-element to the speech 
retaliation test’s first prong. In Garcetti, a defense attorney gave Deputy 
District Attorney Richard Ceballos a case to review.96 Ceballos reviewed 
it and concluded that the arrest warrant contained serious errors.97 He 
wrote a memo to his superiors, recommending dismissal of the case.98 
Ceballos argued with his superiors when they decided to pursue the case 
over his objections and later reiterated his concerns about the warrant in 
court.99 When he was denied a promotion and assigned lower level 
                                                     
89. Id. at 148, 154. 
90. Id. at 143. 
91. See id. at 148.  
92. 543 U.S. 77 (2004). 
93. Id. at 78. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 84–85.  
96. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413–14 (2006). Ceballos said that “it was not unusual for 
defense attorneys to ask calendar deputies to investigate aspects of pending cases.” Id. 
97. Id. at 414. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 414–15. 
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cases, Ceballos sued for speech retaliation.100 
The Court resolved this case by creating an independent sub-element 
from the word “citizen” in speech made as citizens on a matter of public 
concern.101 Before Garcetti, the Court had considered speech “made as a 
citizen on matter of public concern” to comprise a single test of whether 
the speech addressed matters of public concern.102 After Garcetti, if the 
employee spoke pursuant to official duties, then the speech did not 
constitute speech made as a citizen, regardless of whether the speech 
addressed matters of public concern.103 
The Court stated that speech directly related to a job assignment is 
pursuant to official duties, and is denied protection.104 The Court stated 
that speech is not pursuant to official duties simply because the speech 
addresses the subject matter of the employee’s job.105 Rather, pursuant to 
official duties is only that speech with a direct connection to the 
employee’s particular assignments.106 Thus, because Ceballos’ speech 
was directly connected to his workplace assignment, his speech is 
unprotected as pursuant to employment duties.107 
When a court analyzes whether an employee spoke pursuant to 
official duties under the new citizen sub-element, it engages in two 
inquiries. First a court must determine the scope of the duties. Second, a 
court must determine how the contested speech relates to those duties.108 
Because employees originally had the burden of proving whether they 
made their speech as a citizen on matters of public concern, they now 
must prove both that they made their speech as citizens, and that their 
speech addressed matters of public concern.109 If an employee cannot 
prove both, then that employee cannot sustain a claim.110 
                                                     
100. Id. at 415. Ceballos’ superiors denied any retaliation whatsoever, as well as denying that 
Ceballos’ speech qualifies as protected even if they did retaliate. Id. 
101. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court split the 
“citizen on a matter of public concern” prong), cert. denied, Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 
1634 (2012) (mem.). 
102. See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
103. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
104. Id. at 421–22. 
105. Id. at 421. 
106. Id. at 422. 
107. Id. at 421, 424. 
108. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2011). 
109. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court bifurcated 
the “citizen on a matter of public concern” prong), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) 
(mem.). 
110. See id. 
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Although the Court identified the new citizen sub-element, it refused 
to create a framework to help lower courts define what qualifies as 
pursuant to employment duties.111 However, the Garcetti Court stated 
that “the proper inquiry is a practical one. Formal job descriptions often 
bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to 
perform.”112 Thus the first inquiry of the citizen sub-element requires the 
court to determine what the employee actually does, rather than relying 
upon the employee’s job description.113 
The circuit courts, in attempting to apply Garcetti’s citizen sub-
element, have considered the following: 
[W]hether the employee was commissioned or paid to make the 
speech in question, the subject matter of the speech, whether the 
speech was made up the chain of command, whether the 
employee spoke at her place of employment, whether the speech 
gave objective observers the impression that the employee 
represented the employer when she spoke, whether the 
employee’s speech derived from special knowledge obtained 
during the course of her employment, and whether there is a so-
called citizen analogue to the speech.114 
Courts use these factors to determine whether speech is pursuant to 
official duties, and thus whether the speech is made as a citizen.115 
 Circuit courts have divided into two groups regarding which factor 
deserves the greatest weight. Some circuits have ruled that speech made 
“up the chain of command to their superiors,” constitutes speech 
pursuant to official duties.116 Other circuits have ruled that employee 
speech is pursuant to official duties if the employees’ speech directly 
                                                     
111. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
112. Id. at 424–25. This is designed in large part to prevent employers from “creating excessively 
broad job descriptions.” Id. at 424. Justice Souter expressed this concern in his dissent, id. at 431 
n.2, whose words have arguably become prophetic, as seen in Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 
1278, 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009). In Abdur-Rahman, inspectors persistently asked for information 
about sewer overflows from their government employer. Id. at 1280. In response, the employer 
changed the inspectors’ enumerated job duties to include inspection of sewer overflow, and fired 
them within two months. Id. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the termination in part because the 
employer fired the employee for complaints made immediately after the change in employment 
duties, as opposed to the information requests pre-dating the change. Id. at 1284.  
113. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 31; Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25. 
114. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32 (citations omitted). 
115. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
116. Tyler Wiese, Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the Wake of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 515–19 (2010). This includes the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Tenth Circuits. Id. at 516. 
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relates to their “assigned responsibilities.”117 In any event, requiring 
employees to prove that they spoke pursuant to their official duties 
greatly lowers the employee’s chances of success, by increasing the 
difficulty of proving the first prong.118 
2. The Pickering Balancing Prong Requires a Court to Balance 
Employee Interests in Speaking Against Employer Interests in an 
Efficient Workplace 
If an employee proves both the citizen and matters of public concern 
sub-elements of the speech retaliation test’s first prong,119 a court moves 
to the second prong, called Pickering balancing.120 This balancing 
requires a court to weigh the employee’s interest in speaking as a citizen 
on a matter of public concern against the employer’s interest “in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”121 While it is clear that employees bear the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they prevail on the first 
prong,122 no such clarity exists for the second prong’s burden of proof. 
This section will first explain the Pickering balancing prong, and then 
explain the “quasi-military” rule applicable to that prong. Finally, this 
section will explain that the circuit courts are confused as to the 
Pickering balancing prong’s burden of proof. 
a. Pickering Balancing Requires a Court to Balance the Employee’s 
Free Speech Interest in Speaking Against the Employer’s Interest 
in Promoting Workplace Efficiency 
Pickering balancing is the speech retaliation test’s second prong, and 
occurs only after an employee establishes that his or her speech was 
spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern.123 This balancing 
analysis requires a court to balance the employee’s interest in speaking 
as a citizen on a matter of public concern against the employer’s interest 
“in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through 
its employees.”124 
                                                     
117. Id. at 519–23. This includes the Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Id. at 519 n.96.  
118. See Roesler, supra note 7, at 419 (explaining that the Court has greatly narrowed the test). 
119. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416. 
120. See id. at 418; Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996).  
121. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417. 
122. See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
123. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
124. See id. at 418–19 (explaining that the Court must consider the employer’s interest in “the 
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A court conducting Pickering balancing determines the damage of the 
citizen speech to the efficiency of the employer’s workplace.125 The 
Court’s analysis requires examining the time, the place, and the manner 
of the speech.126 The Supreme Court has consistently stated that no 
factor is dispositive and has refused to set a clear standard.127 Instead, 
the trial court must decide each case on its unique facts.128 
Certain principles guide the court’s case-by-case analysis. 
Government agencies may only restrict employee speech to the extent 
that it is “necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and 
effectively.”129 When it acts as an employer, the State has “broader 
discretion”130 to regulate speech than when it is acts as a sovereign.131 
Therefore, “[t]he question becomes whether the relevant government 
entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently 
from a regular member of the general public.”132 
The Court considers the “nature” of the employee’s speech, the 
employee’s particular job within the government agency, and the overall 
purpose of that agency,133 when determining whether the employee’s 
speech disrupts his or her workplace.134 The Court has required that 
“restrictions [the employer] imposes must be directed at speech that has 
some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”135 So even if speech 
would disrupt other workplaces, the employer can only restrict it if it 
disrupts the employee’s particular workplace.136 
Consider Rankin, for example, where the Court ruled in favor of 
                                                     
efficient provision of public services”). 
125. See id.  
126. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). 
127. Id. at 154 (“Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements 
by . . . public employees may be thought by their superiors . . . to furnish grounds for dismissal, we 
do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to lay down a general standard against which all such 
statements may be judged.”) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)); see also 
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85 (1987) (“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a 
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, 
as revealed by the whole record.”) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48).  
128. See supra note 127. 
129. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419. 
130. Id. at 418. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987). 
134. Id. 
135. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
136. See id. 
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McPherson—an employee who expressed her hope that someone would 
assassinate President Reagan.137 In Rankin, the Court conducted 
Pickering balancing and ruled that McPherson’s interest in stating her 
hope that someone would kill President Reagan outweighed her 
employer’s interest in workplace harmony.138 McPherson served as a 
clerical worker in a local law enforcement agency but had no connection 
to the law enforcement work.139 The Court thus did not think that the 
death wish would seriously harm the functioning of McPherson’s 
workplace.140 
Conversely, consider Connick, where the Court upheld Sheila 
Meyers’ termination for her speech criticizing the operation of the 
prosecutor’s office where she worked.141 In Connick, Pickering 
balancing led the Court to rule against the employee because her 
questionnaire concerned her personal workplace grievances.142 Thus, the 
more attenuated the connection between the employee’s speech and her 
work, the more likely that the employee’s interests will outweigh the 
employer’s interests,143 because the speech is less likely to threaten 
workplace harmony if it has nothing to do with the employee’s job.144 
Connick addressed the question of how to deal with speech that was 
mostly of private concern but had a small amount of public concern. In 
Connick, the Court explained that the employer’s burden of proving that 
                                                     
137. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386. 
138. Id. at 380, 392. Justice Powell cast the deciding vote. In his concurrence he stated:  
There is no dispute that McPherson’s comment was made during a private conversation 
with a co-worker who happened also to be her boyfriend. She had no intention or 
expectation that it would be overheard or acted on by others. . . . If a statement is on a 
matter of public concern, as it was here, it will be an unusual case where the employer’s 
legitimate interests will be so great as to justify punishing an employee for this type of 
private speech that routinely takes place at all levels in the workplace. The risk that a 
single, offhand comment directed to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the 
work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders on the fanciful. To the 
extent that the full constitutional analysis of the competing interests is required, I generally 
agree with the Court’s opinion.  
Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring). 
139. Id. at 392. 
140. Id.  
141. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).  
142. See id. at 152. 
143. Compare id., with Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390–92. 
144. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. This general concept of the 
importance of the speech’s connection to the workplace in analyzing “Pickering balancing” is what 
the Garcetti Court used to form the “citizen” sub-element, disallowing suits where the speech is 
“pursuant to official duties” from even reaching “Pickering balancing.” See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410, 422–24 (2006) (explaining how Connick and Pickering support the Garcetti holding).  
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it prevails on Pickering balancing varies depending on how strongly 
connected the speech is to matters of public concern.145 The Court 
determined that the questionnaire at issue was almost devoid of public 
concern.146 However the Court determined that one question, regarding 
pressure to participate on political campaigns, constituted a matter of 
public concern.147 The Court said “the State’s burden in justifying a 
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s 
expression.”148 Thus, the greater the connection between the speech at 
issue and matters of public concern, the more protection it is entitled to, 
and vice versa.149 Because the speech in Connick “touched upon matters 
of public concern in only a most limited sense,”150 the employer had a 
low burden.151 Meyers lost under Pickering balancing because of that 
low burden.152 
The location where the speech occurred matters more in the Pickering 
balancing analysis than in the previous citizen on a matter of public 
concern analysis.153 Where the speech is public, the Court will primarily 
focus on how the content of the speech affects work-place harmony.154 
Where the speech is private, the court will consider the time, place, and 
manner of the speech and how such factors affect work-place 
                                                     
145. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. 
146. Id. at 154 (“Myers’ questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most 
limited sense; her survey, in our view, is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance 
concerning internal office policy.”). 
147. Id. at 149. 
148. Id. at 150. 
149. See id.; see also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 237 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, Byrne v. 
Jackler, No. 11-517, 2012 WL 603078 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2012). 
150. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. 
151. See id. at 149–50, 154 (explaining that the District Court placed too high a burden on the 
employer, because “[t]he limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require that 
Connick tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his 
authority, and destroy close working relationships”).  
152. See id. 
153. Compare Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414, 415 n.4 (1979), with 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-50, 154. 
154. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4 (“Although the First Amendment’s protection of government 
employees extends to private as well as public expression, striking the Pickering balance in each 
context may involve different considerations. When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the 
content of his statements that the court must assess to determine whether they in any way either 
impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfered with 
the regular operation of the schools generally. . . . Private expression, however, may in some 
situations bring additional factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government employee 
personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be 
threatened not only by the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and 
place in which it is delivered.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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harmony.155 
b. Some Lower Courts Apply Pickering Balancing with Increased 
Deference Towards Quasi-Military Employers 
Some circuit courts have applied the second prong—Pickering 
balancing—with heightened deference towards employers who qualify 
as quasi-military organizations.156 Quasi-military organizations are those 
organizations possessing a strong connection to public safety, including 
police officers,157 firefighters,158 and border patrol agents.159 Courts 
adopting the theory assert that when conducting the balancing analysis, 
courts should allow quasi-military organizations extra deference in firing 
disobedient employees because the employers’ public safety purpose 
increases their “need to secure discipline, mutual respect, trust and 
particular efficiency among the ranks.”160 Thus, these circuit courts give 
employers extra deference in the public safety context, greatly benefiting 
such quasi-military employers at the expense of employee speech. 
Circuit courts that adopt the quasi-military rule justify it by extending 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Kelley v. Johnson161 to the speech 
retaliation context.162 In Kelley, a police officer challenged the police 
department’s hair grooming regulations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to liberty (as opposed to a First Amendment free 
speech challenge).163 The Supreme Court ruled that the regulations did 
not violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty.164 The Court 
stated that regardless of whether the quasi-military exception applied in 
                                                     
155. See id. (“Private expression . . . may in some situations bring additional factors to the 
Pickering calculus,” including “the manner, time, and place in which [the speech] is delivered”); see 
also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389 (1987) (indicating the importance of time, place, and 
manner with private speech, suggesting that “[t]here is no suggestion that any member of the 
general public was present or heard McPherson’s statement” in justifying protecting her speech 
under “Pickering balancing”). 
156. See, e.g., Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000); Kokkinis 
v. Ivkovich, 185 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 1999); Dunn v. Carroll, 40 F.3d 287, 292 (8th Cir. 1994); 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 955 F.2d 998, 1004 (5th Cir. 1992). 
157. Oladeinde, 230 F.3d at 1293. 
158. Figueroa-Rodrigues v. Lopez-Rivera, 878 F.2d 1488, 1489 (1st Cir. 1998). 
159. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 955 F.2d at 1004. 
160. Anderson v. Burke Cnty., 239 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hansen v. 
Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573, 577 (11th Cir. 1994)) (citation omitted). 
161. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
162. See, e.g., Hansen, 19 F.3d at 577. 
163. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239–41 (1976). 
164. Id. at 248–49. 
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this case, the police department had a unique need to maintain its “esprit 
de corps.”165 The Court considered it “highly significant” that the police 
officer limited his challenge to his Fourteenth Amendment interest.166 
Employers are entitled to far more deference in regards to employees’ 
liberty challenges than those “based on the explicit language of the First 
Amendment.”167 Thus, because the police officer in Kelley was asserting 
only a Fourteenth Amendment liberty challenge, the court gave greater 
deference to the employer than it would have if it were a free speech 
claim. The deference given to employers regarding Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty claims led the Court to apply rational basis review to 
the case and uphold the hair grooming regulations.168 
c. The Circuits Inconsistently Interpret Who Bears the Burden of 
Proving Pickering Balancing 
The circuit courts are not consistent in their interpretation of who 
bears the burden of proving Pickering balancing. Most circuits have 
stated that the specific burden courts will apply when engaging in the 
balancing prong belongs with the employer.169 However, the Eleventh 
Circuit has consistently ruled that the burden on the balancing analysis 
belongs with the employee.170 Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit goes back 
and forth on who has the burden.171 
                                                     
165. Id. at 246. “This view was based upon the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the ‘unique 
judicial deference’ accorded by the judiciary to regulation of members of the military was 
inapplicable because there was no historical or functional justification for the characterization of the 
police as ‘para-military.’ But the conclusion that such cases are inapposite, however correct, in no 
way detracts from the deference due Suffolk County’s choice of an organizational structure for its 
police force.” Id.  
166. Id. at 244–45 (“Respondent has sought the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, not as a 
member of the citizenry at large, but on the contrary as an employee of the police 
department . . . . We think . . . [this distinction] is highly significant.”). At the Supreme Court level, 
only dissents have suggested that an organization’s “quasi-military” nature should apply in the First 
Amendment context. See Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. 926, 929 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 401 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
167. See supra note 166. 
168. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247. 
169. See, e.g., Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009); Commc’ns Workers of Am. 
v. Ector Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427, 436–37 (5th Cir. 2006); McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 
672 (7th Cir. 2004); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 193 (2d Cir. 2003); Kincade v. City of 
Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 397 (8th Cir. 1995); Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 895 (3d Cir. 
1995); Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 830 F.2d 294, 303–04 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
170. See, e.g., Douglas v. DeKalb Cnty., 308 F. App’x 396, 399 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009); Boyce v. 
Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1342 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Burke Cnty., 239 F.3d 1216, 1219 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
171. See Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 933 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating in one 
 
Hudson - FINAL word.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/26/2012  5:55 PM 
796 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:777 
 
The circuit courts’ confusion stems from the fact that the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence is insufficiently clear as to whether employees or 
employers bear the burden of proving that they prevail on Pickering 
balancing. Most of the time, the Court has avoided the issue, saying only 
that the Court must balance.172 In Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. 
Doyle,173 the Court stated that the employee must establish that his 
speech was “constitutionally protected.”174 It also said that Pickering 
balancing constituted a factor of whether speech was “constitutionally 
protected,” implying that employees have the burden of proving that 
they prevail under the analysis.175 
However, properly reading the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reveals 
that the employer bears the burden of proving Pickering balancing.176 
Rankin solidifies this principle with the following language: 
Because McPherson’s statement addressed a matter of public 
concern, Pickering next requires that we balance McPherson’s 
interest in making her statement against the interest of the State, 
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees. The State bears a 
burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds.177 
Most circuits have followed the Court’s lead in these cases and required 
                                                     
paragraph that “[the plaintiff] must still show that his interest in the speech outweighed the 
government’s countervailing interest in regulating the speech to maintain an effective working 
environment,” but stating in another paragraph that “the State’s burden in justifying a particular 
discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s expression”). Compare Saurini v. 
Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist., 191 F. App’x 628, 632 (10th Cir. 2006) (implying that the burden is with 
the employee to establish “Pickering balancing” by stating that “[i]f these three factors [including 
“Pickering balancing”] are met, the burden shifts to the employer to establish [the fourth factor]”) 
(emphasis added), with Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1207 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (“Apparently, [the District Court’s determination that the employee failed to prove 
“Pickering balancing”] is premised on an error of law, as the employer bears the burden of 
justifying its regulation of the employee’s speech.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983)).   
172. See White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 929 P.2d 396, 405 (1997) (“The Supreme Court 
does not discuss the [Pickering balancing prong] in terms of burdens of proof but rather says that ‘it 
is the court’s task’ to balance the interests of the employee against the interests of the employer and 
to determine, as a matter of law, which of those interests is greater.”) (citing Waters v. Churchill, 
511 U.S. 661, 667–69 (1994); Connick, 461 U.S. at 142; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
569 (1968); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385–86 (1987)). 
173. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
174. Id. at 287. 
175. Id. at 284 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569).  
176. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. 
177. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
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the employer to prove that it prevails on Pickering balancing.178 
3. The Employee’s Protected Speech Must Have Caused the 
Termination 
If the employee makes it through the first citizen on a matter of public 
concern prong and the second Pickering balancing prong, the Court 
moves to the third “causation” prong, which requires a court to 
determine whether the employee’s speech caused his termination.179 
Causation has two sub-elements of its own.180 The burden of proof is on 
the employee for causation’s first sub-element, and on the employer for 
the second sub-element.181 
The Court defined the nature of the causation prong in Mt. Healthy. In 
Mt. Healthy, a public school chose not to rehire a teacher who made 
inappropriate and offensive comments on a regular basis.182 However, 
one of the school’s key reasons for refusing to rehire him was that he 
wrote a memorandum criticizing the school’s new dress code.183 The 
school promoted the dress code with the design of increasing support for 
proposed school bonds.184 The teacher delivered the speech to a radio 
disc jockey, who broadcasted it on the radio.185 The trial court ruled that 
the radio address was “clearly constitutionally protected.”186 
The Mt. Healthy Court created a causation prong with two sub-
elements.187 The Court explicitly gave the burden of proof to the 
employee for the first sub-element and to the employer for the second 
sub-element.188 For the first sub-element, the employee must prove to a 
court that his or her protected speech was a “substantial factor” 
                                                     
178. See supra note 169. 
179. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Among other things, Doyle made obscene gestures to cafeteria staff, and made comments to 
a teacher that resulted in said teacher slapping him. Id. at 281–82. 
183. Id. at 282–83. 
184. Id. at 282. 
185. Id. at 282–83. 
186. See id. at 283 (“The District Court . . . concluded that respondent Doyle’s telephone call to 
the radio station was ‘clearly protected by the First Amendment’ . . . . The District Court did not 
expressly state what test it was applying in determining that the incident in question involved 
conduct protected by the First Amendment, but simply held that the communication to the radio 
station was such conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion.”) (citations 
omitted). 
187. See id. at 287. 
188. Id. 
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contributing to his or her termination.189 Once the employee establishes 
this, the second sub-element allows the employer to affirmatively defend 
against the suit by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would have fired the employee even if the employee had not uttered the 
protected speech.190 
B. Garcetti Blurred the Distinction Between the Citizen on a Matter of 
Public Concern Prong and the Pickering Balancing Prong, Further 
Complicating the Speech Retaliation Analysis 
Until recently, the three prongs discussed above comprised the speech 
retaliation test: (1) citizen on a matter of public concern, (2) Pickering 
balancing, and (3) causation. However, the Garcetti Court further 
complicated this framework by blurring the lines between the first and 
second speech retaliation prongs. 
In Garcetti, the Court created a “citizen” sub-element to the first 
prong of speech retaliation, and used it to hold that Ceballos’ speech was 
unprotected because it was pursuant to his employment duties.191 One of 
the Court’s main rationales for doing this was that when balancing the 
employee and employer interests in the context of workplace 
assignments, the employer’s interest in workplace effectiveness is 
entitled to additional weight.192 
Garcetti’s rationale blurs the first and second prongs by using the 
second prong’s balancing test to justify adopting the citizen sub-element 
of the first prong.193 In doing this, the Court balanced the employer’s 
interests against the employee’s when analyzing the first prong of speech 
retaliation.194 Such a mixing of prongs is contrary to the Court’s 
                                                     
189. See id. 
190. See id. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Doyle’s claim 
survived the new holding. Id. The district court determined that the employer succeeded on the 
second sub-element, as the School Board “established by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Doyle would not have been renewed because of the incidents—exclusive of the radio incident—
which had occurred during the year or so prior to the nonrenewal.” Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 670 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting the trial court and upholding the trial 
court’s ruling on remand). 
191. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235, 238 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 
420–22), cert denied Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.).  
192. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422–23 (2006) (“[The Court’s holding] is supported by 
the emphasis of our precedents on affording government employers sufficient discretion to manage 
their operations. Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an employee in 
his or her professional capacity.”). 
193. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 571. 
194. See id. 
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traditional test, which did not engage in Pickering balancing until the 
employee prevailed on the first prong.195 Despite this, the Garcetti Court 
states that the balancing should not occur where the speech fails to pass 
the citizen sub-element of the first prong.196 
 Thus, the Garcetti Court created a new underlying principle that 
extends beyond the citizen sub-element.197 Where employee speech 
clearly fails to prevail on the second prong of Pickering balancing, a 
court will dispose of the claim at the first prong without addressing the 
second prong.198 The Court’s maneuver serves as a kind of preliminary 
Pickering balancing, as the Court will deny categories of speech 
protection where Pickering balancing strongly disfavors such speech 
before technically reaching that very balancing analysis.199 The Court’s 
decision provides another method of disposing of the employee’s claim 
at the first prong, thus increasing the difficulty an employee faces in 
establishing a claim. 
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS SHOULD HAVE TO PROVE THE 
PICKERING BALANCING PRONG BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
As discussed above, the speech retaliation test consists of three 
prongs. The first is to determine whether the speech is made as a citizen 
on a matter of public concern. The second prong requires a balancing of 
the employee’s interest in speaking against the employer’s interest in 
running an efficient workplace. Finally, the Court considers the third 
prong of causation. 
Pickering balancing has an unclear burden of proof.200 This Comment 
argues first that employers should have the burden of proving that they 
prevail under the balancing analysis, and second that the Court should 
set the employer’s burden at clear and convincing evidence. 
                                                     
195. See supra Part II.A.2. 
196. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (“When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of 
public concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests 
surrounding the speech and its consequences. When, however, the employee is simply performing 
his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of scrutiny.”) (emphasis added).  
197. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 571. 
198. See id. 
199. Sheldon Nahmod points out that this serves as part of the Court’s trend of moving away 
from “ad hoc balancing” where the court does an uncontrolled balancing at each case to “categorical 
balancing,” where what speech is protected turns on which of a series of discrete categories it falls 
into. See Nahmod, supra note 6, at 569–73. 
200. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.  
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A. Supreme Court Precedent Indicates that the Employer Should Bear 
the Burden of Proof on Pickering Balancing 
Much confusion exists as to whether the burden of proof on the 
second prong of Pickering balancing should fall on the employer or the 
employee.201 However, an analysis of Supreme Court precedent shows 
that employers should have the burden of proving that they prevail on 
Pickering balancing.202 Mt. Healthy is the only Supreme Court precedent 
cited by the minority of courts that place the burden of this balancing 
analysis on the employee.203 In Mt. Healthy, the Court said that the 
burden of proving that the employee’s speech was constitutionally 
protected was “properly placed upon [the employee].”204 It stated that 
Pickering balancing is a factor in determining whether speech is 
constitutionally protected.205 Some courts have interpreted this statement 
to mean that employees bear the burden of proving that they prevail on 
Pickering balancing.206 
However, the courts are incorrect in interpreting Mt. Healthy as 
setting the Pickering balancing burden against the employee. First, Mt. 
Healthy addressed a question of the burden of causation, which is 
entirely different from the balancing analysis.207 Mt. Healthy is properly 
read as being limited to the causation question, which is irrelevant to the 
question of the burdens of Pickering balancing.208 
                                                     
201. Compare Anderson v. Burke Cnty., 239 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that the 
employee must prove “Pickering balancing”), with Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 
2009) (stating that the burden is with the employer); see also White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 13, 
929 P.2d 396, 404–05 (1997) (“The nature of the balancing analysis required under 
Pickering . . . appear[s] to have created some confusion with respect to which party has the ‘burden 
of proving’ [it].”). 
202. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (stating that the employer must prove 
“Pickering balancing”). 
203. See, e.g., Anderson, 239 F.3d at 1219 (stating that the employee must prove “Pickering 
balancing”); Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 1995). 
204. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
205. Id. at 284 (“[W]hether speech of a State employee is constitutionally protected expression 
necessarily entails striking ‘a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’”) (quoting 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
206. See Anderson, 239 F.3d at 1219. 
207. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286–87 (addressing whether the employer could defend by 
proving that the employer would have fired the employee even in absence of the protected speech).   
208. See id. at 284–85 (stating that the Court accepts the district court’s ruling on “Pickering 
balancing” and then moves on to the “Causation” question); see also Local 144 Nursing Home 
Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 592 n.5 (1993) (“It was, if anything, those dicta 
themselves—uninvited, unargued, and unnecessary to the Court’s holdings—which insulted [the 
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Second, and most importantly, the Court decided Mt. Healthy before 
much of the case law that fractured speech retaliation law into a complex 
series of prongs and sub-elements.209 When the Court decided Mt. 
Healthy, speech retaliation law constituted one large amorphous 
principle, not yet broken down into the previously discussed parts.210 
The Court had not broken down the test because the Court’s primary 
purpose in Pickering was to state that a balancing analysis actually 
existed.211 The Court waited until future cases to clarify the analysis.212 
The Court specified the doctrine in the 1980s with cases such as 
Connick and Rankin, long after deciding Mt. Healthy.213 In clarifying, 
the Court separated the citizen on a matter of public concern prong from 
the Pickering balancing prong.214 At that time, the Court clarified that the 
determination of whether speech is constitutionally protected does not 
include Pickering balancing, but instead precedes it.215 
In Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,216 the Court added 
further support to this ordering of the speech retaliation test.217 Umbehr 
states that after the employee proves that his conduct qualifies as 
constitutionally protected, “termination because of [that speech] may be 
justified when legitimate countervailing government interests are 
sufficiently strong.”218 Thus, Pickering balancing occurs only after a 
court has determined that the speech is constitutionally protected. 
                                                     
virtue of judicial restraint]; and we would add injury to insult by according them precedential 
effect.”). 
209. The Court decided Mt. Healthy in 1977. The most important case law did not occur until 
after 1980, including Connick, Rankin, and Garcetti. See Garcetti v. Caballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); 
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
210. See supra Part II.A. 
211. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
212. See Roesler, supra note 7, at 398–99 (“[Following Pickering,] [s]ubsequent cases served to 
narrow and refine the [Speech Retaliation] test by focusing on the methods used and factors 
employed in administering the balancing [prong].”); see also Cooper, supra note 39, at 74.  
213. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; Connick, 461 U.S. at 149–50; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 
418. A similar doctrinal split occurred between “a citizen on a matter of public concern,” resulting 
in a sub-element for “citizen,” and a separate sub-element for “matters of public concern.” See 
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420–22), cert 
denied Byrne v. Jackler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.); see also Dale, supra note 40, at 
189 (explaining the breakdown of the balancing of interests into two prongs).  
214. See supra note 213.  
215. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996). Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. 
at 568, with Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (showing how the speech retaliation doctrine has changed 
over time). 
216. 518 U.S. 668 (1996). 
217. Id. at 675. 
218. Id.  
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As the speech retaliation test has evolved, the Court gave employees 
the burden of proving that they spoke as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern219 but gave employers the burden of proving that they prevail on 
Pickering balancing.220 When discussing the balancing analysis in 
Rankin, the Court stated that “[t]he State bears a burden of justifying the 
discharge on legitimate grounds.”221 Rankin shows that when the Court 
reaches the Pickering balancing prong the Court requires the employer 
to prove that its justification for terminating the employee outweighs the 
employee’s interest in speaking. 
While Rankin provides the Court’s most direct statement that the 
employer bears the burden of proof under Pickering balancing, many 
Supreme Court cases lend additional support to this assertion.222 For 
example, the Connick Court stated that “the state’s burden in justifying a 
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s 
expression.”223 Garcetti also supports the assertion that employers bear 
the burden of proof when the Court conducts Pickering balancing. 
Garcetti states that once the Court reaches that second prong, “the 
question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an 
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any 
other member of the general public.”224 
The speech retaliation test’s underlying rationale further supports that 
the employer has the burden of proving that it prevails on Pickering 
balancing.225 Pickering’s underlying rationale is that because the State 
has unique and important interests as an employer, those interests justify 
courts granting the government greater deference in regulating its 
employees’ speech.226 
Thus, regulating employee speech is different only because the 
                                                     
219. Sheppard v. Beerman, 317 F.3d 351, 355 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 
225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining how the Court bifurcated the “citizen on a matter of public 
concern” prong), cert. denied, Byrne v. Jackler,  __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.).  
220. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (stating that the employer must prove “Pickering balancing”). 
221. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).  
222. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410, 418 (2006). 
223. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149–50. While the Connick Court ruled that the court placed too high 
of a burden on the state in the particular case, it made clear that the employer always bears the 
burden of proof on Pickering balancing. It is simply a burden set at different levels depending on 
the particular case. See id. 
224. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.  
225. See generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
226. See id. (“[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees 
that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the 
citizenry in general.”) (emphasis added). 
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employer’s interests “differ significantly” from regulating citizen 
speech.227 If speech reaches Pickering balancing, the employee has 
already shown that he spoke as a citizen on matters of public concern.228 
Therefore the employee has already demonstrated that his speech is 
equivalent to the speech of a general citizen in Pickering’s terms.229 
Once the employee has made this showing, courts should require the 
employer to counteract the employee’s proven assertion—that his speech 
is the speech of a regular citizen—by proving that the employment 
context justifies regulating the employee’s speech in a manner 
significantly different than a regular citizen’s speech. 
B. The Court Should Require the State to Prove Pickering Balancing 
with Clear and Convincing Evidence 
As the previous section demonstrates, the burden of proof on the 
Pickering balancing prong is properly placed with the State.230 However, 
while the question of who bears the burden is confusing, so too is the 
question of how the Court should apply this burden.231 This confusion 
encourages courts to conduct the balancing in a haphazard manner to 
reach a desired result in each case, rather than engaging in rigorous 
analysis.232 
Clarifying the height of the employer’s burden will help tidy up the 
speech retaliation test. This section argues that only speech having the 
strongest connection to matters of public concern ever reaches the 
Pickering balancing prong of the current speech retaliation test, and thus 
all such speech is entitled to a higher burden of proof. This section also 
argues that because clear and convincing evidence is the standard that 
courts use to raise the burden against the State in the First Amendment 
context, courts should extend this practice to the speech retaliation 
context. 
                                                     
227. See id. 
228. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
229. See id. 
230. See supra Part III.A. 
231. Anne Gasperini DeMarco, The Qualified Immunity Quagmire in Public Employees’ Section 
1983 Free Speech Cases, 25 REV. LITIG. 349, 377–78 (2006) (explaining the “widely different 
evidentiary burdens” that courts apply). 
232. Id. at 365–66.  
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1. The Employer Should Have to Satisfy a High Burden of Proof for 
Employee Speech That Reaches Pickering Balancing 
Employers should face a high burden in proving that their interests 
outweigh those of employees for speech surviving to the Pickering 
balancing prong because speech that reaches this second prong has the 
strongest connection to matters of public concern. Connick declared that 
“Pickering unmistakably states . . . that the State’s burden in justifying a 
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s 
expression.”233 Thus, the closer that speech is related to “internal office 
policy,” the lower the burden of proof.234 Likewise, the stronger the 
employee’s argument that the speech is made as “a citizen on a matter of 
public concern,” the higher the burden of proof the employer should 
face.235 
Consider this scaling burden of proof in light of the modern speech 
retaliation jurisprudence. With every case, the Court has narrowed the 
speech that qualifies as that made by a citizen on a matter of public 
concern.236 The narrowing occurred in Connick, when the Court ruled 
that protection did not extend to people speaking on internal 
employment issues.237 The Waters principle supported by seven justices 
of the Court—that what the employer believes the employee said 
controls238—further increases the likelihood employers will prevail by 
consistently favoring the employer where a legitimate dispute exists as 
to what the employee said. 
                                                     
233. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). In Connick, the Court overturned the district 
court for placing too high of a burden on “Pickering balancing.” Id. at 154. However, the Supreme 
Court only did this because they believed that Meyer’s speech “touched upon matters of public 
concern in only a most limited sense,” id., determining that her speech was “most accurately 
characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy.” Id. The Court 
determined that her speech was therefore entitled to the lowest of Connick’s floating burden. See id. 
at 149–50, 154.  
234. Id. at 153–54. 
235. See id. at 150; see also McBee v. Jim Hogg Cnty., 730 F.2d 1009, 1017 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(explaining that the Pickering balancing prong “require[es] a stronger showing of disruption as the 
employees’ speech moves closer to core ‘public concerns’”) (citing Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1692).   
236. Roesler, supra note 7, at 419 (explaining that the Court has greatly narrowed the speech 
retaliation test).  
237. See Karin B. Hoppmann, Concern with Public Concern: Toward A Better Definition of the 
Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 1018 (1997) (explaining that Connick, by 
requiring the employee to prove that his speech regards “matters of public concern,” switched First 
Amendment jurisprudence from making protection of speech the default (with narrow exceptions 
for the State) to making State regulating speech the default (with the employee having to get into a 
narrow exception of “matters of public concern”)).  
238. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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The Court narrowed the speech retaliation test even further in 
Garcetti. To even reach Pickering balancing, employees must now prove 
not only that their speech relates to matters of public concern but also 
that the speech was not pursuant to their official duties.239 If they cannot 
prove both sub-elements, then the Court never reaches the balancing 
prong, which only comes after the employee establishes that he or she is 
speaking as a citizen on matters of public concern.240 
Following Garcetti, courts must engage in a preliminary Pickering 
balancing at the citizen on a matter of public concern prong before even 
reaching Pickering balancing itself.241 Preliminary Pickering balancing 
further narrows the test, as employees fired for speech that is far out of 
balance in favor of the employer have their cases dismissed before 
reaching the balancing analysis.242 
The narrowing of the test means that the speech, which still manages 
to pass the first prong and reach Pickering balancing, constitutes that 
speech with the strongest connection to matters of public concern. 
Combining this with Connick’s statement—that the employer’s burden 
of proving that it prevails under the balancing analysis increases where 
the speech has a stronger relationship to matters of public concern—
reveals that speech reaching Pickering balancing in the modern 
jurisprudence is entitled to a high burden of proof.243 Thus the Court 
should require employers to face a high burden of proof when arguing 
that speech making it to Pickering balancing is sufficiently disruptive to 
outweigh the employee’s protected interests.244 
                                                     
239. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
240. See id. at 418. 
241. See supra Part II.B. 
242. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.  
243. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–54 (1983). 
244. Note that Justice Souter’s dissent in Garcetti indirectly supports this. Souter stated that the 
court should make the second prong of “Pickering balancing” harsher against employees whose 
speech is “pursuant to their official duties.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434–35 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
Souter’s goal in harshly applying “Pickering balancing” was to make it less friendly to the employee 
as an alternative to the majority’s even more employee unfriendly “citizen” sub-element. Id. 
Therefore, because the majority instituted the restrictive “citizen” sub-element, there is no need for 
“Pickering balancing” itself to have strict application, and the Court should therefore interpret it 
leniently against the employee. Id. at 433–34 (explaining that the Court chose to protect employer’s 
interest in running a harmonious workplace by making the categorical “citizen” exclusion as an 
alternative to Souter’s idea of making the Pickering balancing prong harsher).  
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2. The Court Should Use Clear and Convincing Evidence to Raise the 
Employer’s Burden of Proof Under Pickering Balancing 
The Court should apply a high burden against the State when 
conducting Pickering balancing, by setting that burden at clear and 
convincing evidence. In other First Amendment contexts, courts apply a 
clear and convincing evidence standard in order to provide extra 
assurance that burden-holders have proven their case before courts take 
action against speech.245 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court required that the 
plaintiff prove “actual malice” with “convincing clarity,” in order to 
sustain a libel claim against a public figure.246 It did this because of the 
crucial importance the First Amendment has in the press context.247 The 
clear and convincing evidence requirement provided an extra level of 
protection to ensure that the plaintiff actually proved actual malice, 
before the Court took action.248 The Court’s intent in using the higher 
evidentiary burden was to ensure that courts do not accidently restrict 
speech too greatly.249 
The Pickering balancing prong is very similar to the libel context. In 
both situations, the Court wants to ensure that employee speech with the 
strongest connection to matters of public concern is not restricted 
beyond what the First Amendment allows.250 It is true that courts have 
established that the public employer has greater interests in the 
employment context than in other free speech contexts such as libel.251 
However, the employer’s unique interests in the employment context 
are relevant only to what the employer must prove, not the procedural 
burden of proof placed upon the employer. In Sullivan’s libel context, 
the plaintiff had to prove the high substantive standard of actual 
                                                     
245. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 255 n.28 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“The purpose of this standard of proof, [is] to reduce the chances of 
inappropriate decisions . . . .”).  
246. 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964). The Court has maintained this requirement. Masson v. New 
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 508 (1991); Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952, 963 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
247. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270–71. 
248. See id. at 279–83. 
249. See id. at 282–83; see also Harper, 494 U.S. at 255 n.28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The purpose of [the clear and convincing evidence] standard of proof, [is] to 
reduce the chances of inappropriate decisions . . . .”). 
250. Compare New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 282–83, with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968) (both discussing the importance of avoiding too much restriction of speech). 
251. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
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malice.252 The Court set the burden of proof at convincing clarity to 
provide extra insurance that the accuser proved actual malice before the 
State took action.253 
In the speech retaliation context, the employer bears the burden of 
proof on the more employer-friendly substantive standard of Pickering 
balancing.254 This balancing standard is far more generous to the State 
than actual malice255 or the First Amendment’s traditional “narrowly 
tailored to promote a compelling Government interest”256 test. Thus the 
lowered substantive standard of Pickering balancing provides the 
necessary additional weight to employer interests.257 Setting the 
procedural burden at clear and convincing evidence to provide extra 
insurance that the employer has met its burden under the balancing does 
not prevent the balancing prong’s substantive standard from sufficiently 
taking the State’s interests as an employer into account. 
Thus, courts should extend the practice of requiring the government 
to prove its case with clear and convincing evidence in First Amendment 
contexts to Pickering balancing. Requiring the State to meet this high 
procedural burden will ensure that the employer has fully proven its 
claim of workplace disruption before acting against speech. Meanwhile, 
the balancing’s substantive nature will protect the government’s unique 
interests as an employer. 
IV. COURTS SHOULD FAVOR EMPLOYEE SPEECH WHEN 
ANALYZING LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES 
COMMENTING ON THE DRUG WAR 
This section will argue that courts should analyze speech from law 
enforcement employees opposing the war on drugs in a manner that 
favors the employee speech. First, courts should rule that plaintiffs pass 
the first prong of speech retaliation, as commentary on the war on drugs 
                                                     
252. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285–86. 
253. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 255 n.28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
254. See supra Part II.A.2. 
255. Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, with New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80 
(showing how much more speaker-friendly the “actual malice” standard is than the “Pickering 
balancing” prong). 
256. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000)). Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
568, with Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 646 (citing Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813) 
(showing how much more speaker-friendly the narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest 
standard is than the Pickering balancing prong). 
257. See supra note 256. 
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is made as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Second, when 
engaging in the second prong of Pickering balancing, courts should 
refuse to apply the quasi-military rule because Supreme Court precedent 
does not support its existence. 
A. Courts Should Rule that Commentary on the War on Drugs 
Constitutes Speech as a Citizen on a Matter of Public Concern 
When law enforcement employees fired for commenting on the war 
on drugs sue for First Amendment speech retaliation, courts should rule 
that the speech is citizen speech because it is not pursuant to official 
duties and because the speech proposes a change in public policy. 
1. Commentary Concerning the War on Drugs Constitutes Citizen 
Speech Because Such Speech Is Not Pursuant to Official Duties 
Courts should rule that drug enforcement employees commenting on 
the war on drugs generally are not speaking pursuant to their official 
duties. The Garcetti Court ruled that Ceballos made his speech pursuant 
to official duties because the commentary leading to his firing 
constituted a critical part of an official assignment.258 Because Ceballos’ 
employers fired him for speech arising directly from that assignment, the 
Court ruled it pursuant to official duties.259 
Where employers fire employees for commenting on their specific job 
assignments or complaining directly to their superiors, then the 
employers have a strong case under Garcetti. However, in the cases of 
commentary on the war on drugs discussed above, the employees are 
typically speaking either off the cuff or out in public.260 Further, they are 
speaking in general terms about the government’s drug policy, rather 
than a particular assignment or mission designed to effectuate that 
policy.261 
While the speech addresses matters related to their workplace’s 
subject matter, this does not mean that the speech is pursuant to their 
official duties, regardless of whether the Court applies the “assigned 
responsibilities” or “up the chain of command” analysis.262 Speech on 
the war on drugs (at least in the above cases) was not made to a superior, 
                                                     
258. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414–15, 421–22 (2006). The speech regarded a report on 
the sufficiency of a warrant. Id.  
259. Id. 
260. See supra Part I. 
261. See supra Part I. 
262. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
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and thus was not “up the chain of command.” Further, the speech did not 
constitute part of an actual assignment and thus did not relate to the 
employee’s “assigned responsibilities.”263 
The speech at issue in the above cases is more analogous to the 
speech that the Court upheld in Rankin.264 The Court felt comfortable 
adding the citizen sub-element in Garcetti only because it would not 
touch speech unrelated to work assignments.265 Thus the pursuant to 
their official duties rule only touches speech directly related to 
workplace assignments.266 Thus, speech in support of a policy position, 
not related to an employee’s work assignment, is exactly the speech 
Garcetti protected.267 
2. Commentary on the War on Drugs Addresses Matters of Public 
Concern by Proposing a Change in Public Policy 
Courts should not only rule that commentary on the war on drugs is 
citizen speech, but should also rule that such speech addresses matters of 
public concern, because the speech proposes a change in public policy. 
The Court has stated that one of the key determinants of whether speech 
addresses a matter of public concern is whether the speech will help 
inform the public.268 Not only does the employee have a right to deliver 
speech that will inform the public, but the public gains important 
information in hearing opinions from employees, because employees can 
contribute their unique knowledge about their government employer’s 
work.269 For this reason, speech that informs the public is speech 
addressing matters of public concern. 
The speech of employees on the “front lines” of the drug war—such 
as police officers and border patrol agents—constitutes the epitome of 
speech on matters of public concern. After all, these employees have 
direct contact with the successes and failures of the war on drugs. 
Therefore, they are uniquely qualified in knowledge and experience to 
comment on whether the drug war should continue. Law enforcement 
employees’ unique knowledge on the subject of the drug war is 
analogous to the unique knowledge that the teacher in Pickering had 
                                                     
263. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
264. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380–86 (1987). 
265. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). 
266. See id. at 422–23. 
267. See id.  
268. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004). 
269. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1968). 
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regarding education.270 This is exactly the type of speech that the Court 
wanted to protect with the speech retaliation test, and therefore courts 
should rule that such speech addresses a matter of public concern. 
B. Courts Should Not Apply the Quasi-Military Rule When Analyzing 
Pickering Balancing Because Supreme Court Precedent Does Not 
Support It 
When engaging in the second prong of Pickering balancing, courts 
should refuse to apply the quasi-military rule because Supreme Court 
precedent does not support its existence. The only case cited in support 
of the idea that courts should conduct the balancing analysis with 
increased deference to a quasi-military employer is Kelley v. 
Johnson271—where the Supreme Court cited a need for esprit de corps in 
ruling that a police officer’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests did 
not permit him to challenge his employer’s hair grooming regulations.272 
However, the Court in Kelley explicitly distinguished this case from 
the First Amendment context.273 The Court found it highly significant 
that the police officer brought a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, 
because such claims entitle employers to far broader deference than 
those challenges “based on the explicit language of the First 
Amendment.”274 With this in mind, the Court applied a rational basis 
review to the police officer’s claim.275 
Courts are wrong to extend the Kelley holding to the First 
Amendment context because the Court explicitly divorced that holding 
from the First Amendment context. Thus, because all other authority for 
                                                     
270. See id. at 572 (“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have 
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be 
spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear 
of retaliatory dismissal.”).  
271. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).   
272. Id. at 246–49. 
273. Id. at 244–45. 
274. Id. (“Respondent has sought the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, not as a member 
of the citizenry at large, but on the contrary as an employee of the police department . . . . We 
think . . . [this distinction] is highly significant.”). At the Supreme Court level, only dissents have 
suggested that an organization’s “quasi-military” nature should apply in the First Amendment 
context. See Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. 926, 929 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Rankin 
v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 401 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
275. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 
U.S. 622, 641, (1994) (“Where a law is subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the 
rule of rationality which will sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically 
does not have the same controlling force.”) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, 
476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)). 
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the “quasi-military” rule is derived from Kelley, courts should abandon 
the quasi-military rule when analyzing the Pickering balancing prong of 
the speech retaliation test. 
CONCLUSION 
When an employee sues his or her government employer—claiming 
that the employer terminated him or her in violation of the First 
Amendment right to free speech—courts conduct a three-pronged speech 
retaliation test. The first prong requires the employee to prove that his or 
her speech was made as a citizen and addresses a matter of public 
concern. The second prong, called Pickering balancing, constitutes a 
balancing of the employee’s interest in speaking against the employer’s 
interest in maintaining a harmonious and effective work place. The final 
prong requires courts to determine whether the employee’s protected 
speech caused the termination. 
Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that the employer bears the 
burden of showing that it prevails under Pickering balancing. Because 
employees must prove that they prevail on the increasingly narrow first 
prong before reaching the balancing analysis, only that speech with the 
strongest connection to speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern 
reaches Pickering balancing. Combining this with Connick’s rule—that 
the burden of proof on the State rises along with the strength of the 
speech’s connection to matters of public concern—reveals that courts 
should require the employer to prove that it prevails on Pickering 
balancing under the high burden of clear and convincing evidence. 
When applying the speech retaliation test to law enforcement 
employees commenting on the war on drugs, courts should rule in a 
manner that favors employee speech. Courts should rule that the speech 
is made as a citizen because it is not directly related to the employee’s 
work assignments, and that the speech addresses a matter of public 
concern because the speech discusses public policy. When engaging in 
Pickering balancing the Court should not apply the quasi-military 
exception, because Supreme Court case law lends no support to such an 
application. The Court’s adoption of these policies will help ensure that 
citizens like Bryan Gonzalez, Joe Miller, and Jonathan Wender remain 
free to contribute their knowledge and expertise to the marketplace of 
ideas without the Government unreasonably depriving them of their 
livelihoods. 
 
